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CURRENT DECISIONS
AGENCY-MASTER AND SERVANT-INJuRY BY VOLUNTARY ACT OF Co-EMPLOYEE
UNDER WoRE tEN'S COMPENSATION AcTs.-The plaintiff, a "lugger" in the
slaughter house of the defendant, was struck by a piece of meat thrown at him
by a co-employee. Resenting the assault he threw the meat at another employee,
believing him to be the assailant. The other employee, his hands being occupied,
kicked the plaintiff, producing the injury for which recovery is sought. Held,
that the plaintiff should recover, since the injury was one arising out of and in
the course of employment within the 'meaning of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. McLaughlin, J., and Hiscock, C. J., dissenting. Verschleiser v. Joseph
Stern Son Inc. et at. (192o, N. Y.) 128 N. E. 126.
For a discussion of this principle, see COMMENTS (I920) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 669.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-WORKMEN'S COMPENsATION.-The defendant was an Indi-
ana corporation. The plaintiff was the sole dependent of Harry Vincent Randall,
who lost his life while in 'the employ of the defendant. Randall's contract of
employment was executed in Ohio, and among other things it provided that if
any litigation relating to the agreement should arise, the contract was to be con-
strued as if its execution, performance, or cause of action thereon, actually took
place or arose in the District of Columbia. The plaintiff brought an action
under the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act for the death of Randall and
recovered. The defendant brought this appeal from an award of the Industrial
Board. Held, that the defendant could not relieve itself of its duty under the
Act by a foreign contract. Hagenback & Great Wallace Show Co. v. Randall
(I920, Ind. App.) 126 N. E. 5oi.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 72.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--"DuE PROCESS OF LAW" VIOLATED BY THE FOOD CONTROL
ACT.-The defendants were charged under the Food Control Act of August IO,
1917, with limiting the facilities of transporting, producing, and supplying
necessaries. Held, on a motion to quash the indictment, that those sections of
the Act exempting farmers, gardeners, and cobperative societies, violated the
"due process of law" clause of the Fifth Amendment, because of the unreason-
able classification of exemptions. United States v. Armstrong (i92o, D. Ind.)
265 Fed. 683.
See CommENTs, supra,.p. 8z.
CoNaRAcTs-AccoRD---SPr.crrxc PERFORANCE-The plaintiff was indebted to
the defendant, who brought suit at law. That case was pending at the time
of the instant action. Then the parties compromised, in writing under seal,
the plaintiff promising that he would pay to the defendant a certain sum, and
certain monthly installments for the support of the defendant for life; and
the defendant promising that, upon receipt of this said sum, she would reassign
to the plaintiff certain life insurance policies, indorse to him a check payable
to their joint order, and return a will and certain books and documents. The
plaintiff duly tendered performance, but the defendant refused to perform.
The plaintiff, who averred continued readiness to perform, then brought this
bill in equity for specific performance. The lower court held ' that this com-
promise was an accord only, and could not form the basis of an action. Held,
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on appeal, that a new executory contract which includes the settlement of the
original claim, is not a mere accord, but is the substitute for the original claim
or contract, which is merged in it, and may be specifically enforced in a proper
case. Moers v. Moers (yi2o, N. Y.) 128 N. E. 2o2.
This case in the lower court was criticised adversely in (igig) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 114. For a discussion of similar points involved, see (1920) 29 id. 924.
CONTRACTs-OTIoNs-REvoCATION OF AN "ExcLusIvE AGENCY TO REAL
ESTATE."-The plaintiffs had by written agreement secured the exclusive agency
to the defendant's real estate for forty days, during which time the defendant
himself sold it and gave notice to the plaintiffs. The latter brought this action
for their commission. Held, that the agreement was revocable and that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to commission. Beck v. Howard (1920, S. D.)
178 N. W. 579.
The question involved is not really a question of agency but one of contracts.
The court had to decide whether this was an offer, revocable or irrevocable, or
whether it was a contract complete. See COMMENT (I919) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 575.
CRIMINAL LAw-JURsDIcTION OF FEDERAL CouTs-EFEcT OF AnSENCE oir
PENALTY IN THE FOOD CONTROL Acr.-The defendant, a retail grocer, was
charged with selling sugar at an unfair rate, in violation of section four of the
Food Control Act of August 10, 1917. The defendant pleaded guilty and was
convicted. Held, on appeal, that the indictment did not charge a criminal offense,
because the Act prescribed no penalty for its violation. Mossew v. United States
(I92O, C. C. A. 2d) 266 Fed. I8.
See COMMENTS, supra, p. 81.
PROPERTY-EASEMENTS-RIGHT TO WATER FROM SPRING AS EASEMENT IN
GRoss-MRE NON-USER NOT AN ABANDONMENT.-A grant was made of the
privilege to take water from a spring, the grantors covenanting that they would
not sell to others such privilege or take water themselves "to supply any persons
that the parties acting under this deed will supply" except by agreement of
all parties interested. There was evidence of non-user for many years. Held,
that the privilege still existed, but did not pass merely by a conveyance of the
grantee's land. Clement v. Rutland Country Club (i92o, Vt.) io8 Atl. 843.
The court held that the "right" was a profit 6 prendre, which is always
assiguable or devisable, and that since the parties contemplated the sale of
water, it was not appurtenant to any land and hence was in gross. This seems
a correct interpretation of the intention of the parties. See, however, Chase v.
Cram (1916) 39 R. I. 83, 97 Atl. 481, L. R. A. i9i8F, 444, note, where a con-
veyance by a father to his daughter of part of his farm, with "a privilege to
take water from the spring on my farm as occasion may require," was held
appurtenant, so that she could not sell the water from the spring. As to profits
in gross or appurtenant, see (i919) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 218; (i920) id. 696.
The court in the instant case also holds what, in spite of some conflict, is the
better rule, that a servitude is not lost by mere non-user. An intention to
abandon is requisite and this is not to be inferred from such non-user alone.
See New York Central & H. R. Ry. v. City of Chelsea (1912) 213 Mass. 4o,
99 N. E. 455; Pratt v. Sweetser (1878) 68 Me. 344.
PROPETY-EASEMENTS-PREScRIPTIVE RIGHT OF WAY TO WATER AS EASE-
MENT IN GRoss.-Claiming a right of way through a passway over defendant's
land from the highway to a water course as an easement appurtenant to each
of their tracts of land, used under a claim of right for more than the pre-
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scriptive period, plaintiffs sue for an injunction against interference with their
use of the passway. Plaintiffs own small farms along a highway from one to
three miles distant from the passway and they or their grantors would occa-
sionally drive down the public road and use the passway to get water for their
stock and for family use. Held, that only those plaintiffs who had themselves
used the passway for the prescriptive period under a claim of right were entitled
to relief. Thomas v. Brooks (192o, Ky.) 221 S. W. 542.
The rationale of the decision is that the easements were not appurtenant to
the plaintiffs' lands, but were in gross and personal only. The court approves
Graham v. Walker (19o5) 78 Conn. i3o, 61 Atl. 98, to the effect that it is not
indispensable even to a prescriptive easement appurtenant that one of its termini
should be on the dominant estate, but it points out that there was nothing in
the character of the use to bring home to the defendant that it was a necessary
incident to the plaintiffs' farms. This seems an eminently just and satisfactory
way of treating what would otherwise have been unfairly burdensome encum-
brances on the defendant's land. For the distinctions between easements in
gross and appurtenant and the conflict as to the assignability of easements in
gross, see (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 218.
REAL PROPERTY-VESTED REMAINDERS-VALIDITY OF ASSIGNMENT.-The testa-
trix gave her estate in trust, the income to be used to support her son during
his life, and after his death, or her own should she survive him, the estate
to go to X. The plaintiffs claim title under two assignments from X and the
defendants claim title as trustees under the will. Held, that the estate devised
to X was a vested, not a contingent remainder, and that her assignment thereof
to the plaintiffs was valid. Real Est. Title & Ins. Co. v. Dearbor7 et al. (1920,
Me.) log Atl. 816.
The court followed, apparently, the well-settled rules that a remainder will
be construed as vested rather than contingent whenever possible, and that a
remainder is vested if it is of a kind which will take effect in possession when-
ever and however the preceding particular estate determines. Gray, Rule
Against Per'petuities (3d ed. 1915) secs. io5-io8. In Re Whitney's Estate
(1917) 176 Calif. 12, 167, Pac. 399. By this construction the court avoided the
necessity of determining the transferability of contingent remainders and fol-
lowed the well-settled rule, to which judicial history of that very jurisdiction
has long contributed, that vested remainders are fully transmissible as other
species of property.-Woodman v. Woodinan (1896) 89 Me. 131, 35 Atl. 1037.
As to the transmissibility of remainders-contingent and vested-see I Tiffany,
Real Property (2d ed. 192o) secs. 135-147.
SALES-No RIGHT TO COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES REASONABLY PREVENT-
ABLE.-The plaintiff sued to recover damages resulting from the defendant's
refusal to accept and pay for a carload of flour. The defendant counterclaimed
damages on account of the defective quality of a portion of another carload
of flour. The plaintiff contended that the defendant was under a duty to
mitigate his damage by using the flour in the way which would occasion the
least possible loss. Held, that the defendant should recover on his counterclaim
as the defendant was merely under a legal disability to counterclaim for damages
which he ought to have prevented. Rock v. Vandine (192o, Kan.) I8! Pac. 157.
This is the first decision to stamp its approval on the Hohfeldian method
of analysis. Hohfeld, Some Fundainental Legal Conceptions (1913) 23 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 16, (1917) 26 id. 710. 'he legal relation which is most involved
in the instant case is perhaps a no-right; i. e. the defendant has no right to
damages which he reasonably might have prevented. At the same time, as
the court indicates, the defendant is under a disability to create in the plaintiff
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a duty to pay damages, which he himself ought to prevent, or to create the
correlative right in himself.
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-LABILITY OF FATHER FOR INJURY CAUSED BY HIS AUTO-
MOBILE DRIVEN BY SoN.-The defendant's minor son, accompanied by a young
lady friend, negligently drove his father's automobile into the plaintiff's. The
defendant had purchased the car for the pleasure of his family, and had given
his son general permission to use it. Held, that the defendant was not liable.
Pratt v. Cloutier (192o, Me.) l10 Atl. 353.
There is a square conflict of authority on this question. For the opposing
view, see Johnson v. Smith (1919, Minn.) 173 N. W. 675. See also (192o) 29
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 467; (1920) 2o COL L. REv. 213.
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-LABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR FAILURE TO PROVmE PROPER
TooLs.-The plaintiff, a section foreman, was injured by the derailment of a
new standard-make handcar on account of the improper adjustment of its
cogwheel8. The car was purchased by the defendants from a reputable manu-
facturer and had been delivered adjusted. An ordinary inspection of it would
have discovered the defect. It was contended by the defendants that as the
car in question was of standard make and purchased from a reputable manu-
facturer, they were under no duty to inspect it. The trial court instructed the
jury that the defendants were under a duty to inspect. A verdict and judg-
ment for the plaintiff was affirmed by the appellate court Held, that the
instruction to the jury was correct. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Ewing
(192o, Tex. Com. App.) 222 S. W. 198.
This decision seems to uphold the minority doctrine. See (1915) 24 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 348; 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) II20, note.
TORTS-NEGLIGENE-LAST CLEAR CHANCMEA transfer truck in which the
plaintiff was riding had been driven across the defendant's street-car tracks
in a manner prohibited by a city ordinance, and was caught between two cars
going in opposite directions at a speed violating another ordinance. The jury
was instructed that although the plaintiff was negligent, if his negligence had
ceased and the defendant, by the exercise of ordinary care, ought to have seen
the danger in time, the defendant was responsible. The verdict was for the
plaintiff. Held, that there was no error- Atherton v. Topeka Ry. (ig2o, Kan.)
190 Pac. 430.
See COMMENTS (I920) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 542, 86.
TRUSTS-CHARITABLE UsEs-CY PRkS-IMPRACTICABLE BEQUEST.-The testator
bequeathed $5o,00 to the defendant church upon trust for the erection of an
orphanage building. After the making of the will, the cost of building increased
so enormously as to render it undesirable, if not impracticable, to carry out
literally the specific purpose indicated by the testator. Held, that the fund
should be applied together with other funds of the church for the erection of
such a building. Christian v. Catholic Church of St. John the Baptist (1920,
N. J.) Iio Atl. 579.
The decision is in accord with the general rule, that where the inexpediency
of following the directions of the donor is due to a change of circumstances
occurring after his death, the doctrine of cy prbs is properly applied as a rule
of construction. Norris v. Loomis (1913) 215 Mass. 344, 1O2 N. E. 419;
Avery v. Home for Orphans (19IO) 228 Pa. 58, 77 Atl. 241. For an excellent
discussion on the subject see Sanger, Remoteness and Charitable Gifts (1919)
:2 Y.Aiz LAw JoURNA , 46; NoVs (1920) 33 HAiv. L. REv. 598.
